In game theory, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent ingredients of bestresponse behavior. However, beliefs and preferences themselves are likely to interact and this has important implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows to separate different interaction channels. We find that the frequently observed correlation between first-and second-mover behavior primarily originates via an indirect channel, where second-mover decisions influence beliefs via a consensus effect, and the first-mover decision is a best response to these beliefs. Specifically, beliefs about second-mover cooperation are biased toward own second-mover behavior, and most subjects best respond to stated beliefs.
Introduction
In games, both preferences and beliefs drive players' behavior. Preferences are important in the sense that individuals differ in their disposition toward different behavior and their attitude visa-vis other individuals. But what people believe others will do clearly matters as well. This is of particular relevance in social dilemmas, making them ideal test beds for investigating the issue. A person may generally have a very positive individual attitude toward, say, cooperation in a team, but -if she thinks that other people will shirk regardless of the effort she puts into the joint project -she may well shirk herself.
Behavioral economic theory offers a wide range of models that predict how actions in social dilemmas will vary for people with different types of (social) preferences and what an individual's best response is for a given set of beliefs. While these models broaden the spectrum of preferences that people may hold, they typically stick to the standard assumption that people hold correct beliefs (in equilibrium). The risk with this approach is to miss a crucial point: how likely a person thinks it is that others will defect in a social dilemma may well depend on her own attitude toward cooperation. As such an interaction of preferences and beliefs is of general importance for decision making in games, the topic appears to be strangely underdeveloped in the economic literature.
The significance of this issue is underlined by recent findings from sequential social dilemma experiments using a within-subjects design. 1 The data show that subjects who defect as first movers are more likely to exploit first-mover cooperation in their second-mover choice, whereas those who cooperate as first movers are more likely to reciprocate first-mover cooperation. Blanco et al. (2011) have shown this for the sequential-move prisoners' dilemma. 2 Altmann et al. (2008) and Gächter et al. (2011) have a similar result for the trust game and for a sequential voluntary contribution game, respectively.
The observed within-subjects correlation of the first and the second move is provocative in several ways. First, as noted by Blanco et al. (2011) and Altmann et al. (2008) , the finding is at odds with prominent social preference models that are frequently invoked for explaining behavior in social dilemma games. Both inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) and reciprocal preferences (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004) -under standard assumptions, including 1 Earlier experimental analyses of sequential social dilemmas include the sequential-move prisoners' dilemma (Bolle and Ockenfels 1990, Clark and Sefton 2001) , the gift-exchange game (Fehr et al. 1993) , the trust or investment game (Berg et al. 1995) , the lost wallet game (Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2000) , and public-good games with a front runner (Potters et al. 2007) .
( Levine 1998, Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj 2008) are among the alternatives that can explain why first-mover decisions differ between second-mover cooperators and second-mover defectors, even if they hold the same beliefs.
These theories presume a direct, preference-based channel that influences both first-and secondmover behavior. The consensus effect, in contrast, suggests an indirect channel that links preferences (as reflected in a person's second-mover decisions) to the first-mover decision via beliefs. But what is the right approach?
The issue of indirect versus direct channel seems particularly relevant because the consensus effect has emerged already in other settings as a plausible alternative to preference-based explanations in rationalizing certain patterns of behavior. For instance, dictator-and trust-game studies
where participants report what they believe their counterpart expects in the game, show significant correlations between these second-order beliefs and actions. An explanation for this pattern is that some people are guilt averse, that is, they experience a utility loss if they believe to let someone down (Charness and Dufwenberg 2006) . But Ellingsen et al. (2010) conclude from their own experiments that the correlation can almost exclusively be attributed to a consensus effect.
When subjects are informed about their counterpart's first-order belief, this belief has almost zero correlation with own behavior. Such a correlation would, however, be required for the guilt-aversion (that is, preference-based) explanation.
The purpose of our experiment is to deepen the understanding of the patterns of interaction between preferences and beliefs with the help of a sequential-move prisoners' dilemma (SPD) design (Bolle and Ockenfels 1990, Clark and Sefton 2001) . 5 Specifically, our experimental setup refines the handling of subjects' beliefs to disentangle the channels through which preferences and beliefs jointly determine actions in a sequential social dilemma.
We have the following three treatments and main findings:
-Baseline (where we do not elicit beliefs) replicates the correlation of first and second moves previously observed.
-Elicit Beliefs adds an incentivized belief-elicitation stage. We find that first movers overwhelmingly play the (selfish) best response to their stated beliefs about second-mover behavior. At the same time, beliefs are biased toward a subjects's own second-mover choice.
5 Our analysis should also apply to the other sequential social dilemmas mentioned above. The sequential-move prisoners' dilemma shares fundamental properties with, for example, the investment game and the gift-exchange game in that Pareto gains are possible, but that initiating the trade exposes the first mover to risk. In our game, there are efficiency gains from cooperation both at the first stage and at the second stage. The investment game has efficiency gains only at the first stage (the pie size does not increase further if the second mover returns money), whereas the gift-exchange game (and some "trust games" in the literature) only has efficiency gains at the second stage. Eliciting beliefs does not make the correlation of the two moves in the SPD go away, and the elicited beliefs are consistent with an explanation based on a consensus effect.
-In True Distribution, we give as feedback the actual frequency of second-mover cooperators, before subjects decide their first move. Here, too, most subjects do best respond. But the second move still has predictive power for the first move. This suggests that first-mover behavior is not just a selfish best response to beliefs about second movers, but also depends on a general inclination to cooperate in the SPD. Figure 1 illustrates these ideas. Elicit Beliefs allows us to identify whether there is a consensus effect (a correlation between beliefs and second-mover decision) and whether players best respond to their beliefs. This treatment, however, does not rule out the direct channel, and neither does it permit to distinguish between the direct and the indirect channel. For this purpose, True Distribution gives feedback about the profitability of first-mover cooperation that is not influenced by a participant's own second-mover choice. It thereby shuts down the indirect channel, and makes it possible to separate the explanatory power of the direct channel from the indirect effect of second-mover choice via expectations. 6 2 Experimental Design and Procedures
Design
Our design is based on the sequential-move prisoner's dilemma game in Figure 2 . There are two players, the first mover (FM) and the second mover (SM), who each face an action choice whether to cooperate or defect (a ∈ {c, d}). If a F M = d, the game ends with a payoff of 10 for both first mover and second mover. 7 If a F M = c, the payoff depends on the action of the second mover.
The second-mover decision is thus conditional on the first mover choosing to cooperate. Following a SM = c, payoffs are 14 for both first and second mover; following a SM = d, the payoff is 7 for the first mover and 17 for second mover.
We are interested in the impact of beliefs on choices in the SPD. With repeated play, beliefs become confounded with experience. In order to keep this apart, our experiment is one-shot; subjects make each choice exactly once.
All subjects decide in both the first-and the second-mover role. They first decide as the second mover and then as the first mover. (As will become clear below, our design requires this very order of decisions.) We use the so-called strategy-elicitation method with role uncertainty. After participants have made their decisions, they are randomly assigned roles and are randomly matched into pairs, and payoffs are calculated according to the relevant decisions of the participants.
Our treatments are designed to explore how beliefs and actions are related, and whether variation in first-mover behavior is completely captured by differences in beliefs. Specifically, our treatments are as follows (see also Table 1 ). Baseline is our point of departure. In this treatment, we neither elicit beliefs about second-mover cooperation nor do we give feedback on the true frequency of second-mover cooperation. In Elicit Beliefs, participants have to guess how many of the nine other participants in the session cooperate as second movers. This "guess task" is performed between second-and first-mover decisions, and is incentivized. In True Distribution, before subjects decide in the role of the first mover, they are informed about the actual number of second-mover cooperators among the nine other participants in the session.
For the belief-elicitation task ("guess task"), we use a quadratic scoring rule. Figure 2: Sequential-move prisoner's dilemma game ask subjects how many of the nine other participants in the lab cooperate in the role of second mover, and reward the accuracy of this stated belief using the quadratic scoring rule belief-elicitation task payoff = 15
where d i is the difference between player i's guess and the correct number of second-mover cooperators in the session. Large deviations from the correct guess thus are penalized more heavily than small deviations. An accurate guess of how many of the other nine participants in the session chose to cooperate yields a payoff of 15. Rather than using the above formula in the experimental instructions, the reward for the accuracy of the guess (rounded to multiples of 0.1) is presented to the participants as in Table 2 .
Five specific design issues deserve further comment. First, in order to keep the number and nature of decisions as symmetric as possible across treatments, we introduced a belief-elicitation task also in Baseline and in True Distribution. In these treatments, after making their own choices, participants make a guess about the other participants' first move. As beliefs about first-mover choices are not relevant to our research question and this belief-elicitation stage only serves the purpose of keeping the design balanced across treatments in terms of complexity and duration, we will not analyze these guesses in detail.
Elicit Beliefs True Distribution
Second, pilot sessions of the True Distribution treatment suggested that strong emphasis of the feedback's relevance is warranted. While written instructions in the final design are identical to those in the pilot sessions, the oral summary emphasizes the meaning of the feedback. 9
Third, in True Distribution we opted for simplicity in the design. In theory, this design creates an additional incentive for second-mover cooperation relative to the other treatments. Namely, as participants are informed about the number of second-mover cooperators, cooperation as a second mover could in principle increase the first-mover cooperation rate. If subjects reasoned this way there would be a higher second-mover cooperation rate than in Baseline and Elicit Beliefs, which our data, however, clearly reject (see Section 4.1). The experiments use a neutral frame. We relabelled players and actions as follows: FM=A player,
Payoff units were called experimental currency units (ECU).
Procedures
The experiments were carried out computer based with the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) in the Experimental Laboratory of Royal Holloway, University of London. Participants were students from various disciplines, recruited through online and on-campus advertise-ments.
We conducted 16 sessions with ten participants each (that is, a total of 160 participants). Because the experiment is one-shot, each participant provides an independent observation. There were four sessions for Baseline, and six sessions each for Elicit Beliefs and True Distribution (see Table 1 ).
The payment to subjects is either the payoff from playing the SPD game or the payoff from the belief-elicitation task, with the exception of three Elicit Beliefs sessions where both tasks were paid (as explained above this was done in order to check for hedging confounds). To be precise, a random computer draw at the end of the experiment decides which of the two tasks are paid, both being equally likely. To make the possible payoffs from each task approximately equal, we set the scoring factor for the belief-elicitation task to 15 in (1). The final payout in experimental currency units (ECU) was converted into Pounds Sterling at an exchange rate of £ 1 per ECU (in the three
Elicit Beliefs sessions where both tasks were paid, the exchange rate was £ 0.5 per ECU to keep incentives and average earnings similar across sessions).
In the beginning of each session, participants read through the instructions, followed by a control questionnaire that required them to solve simple examples on how actions determine payoffs. Any questions were answered privately. Prior to each task there was an oral summary. (Instructions and the oral summaries are reproduced in the Appendix.) That is, when all participants had finished the control questionnaire, an oral summary for the first task was given; when all had finished the first task, the next task was summarized, etc.
Participants were informed that, after all tasks were completed, they would be randomly assigned a role (that is, first mover or second mover) and would be randomly paired with a participant in the room that was assigned the opposite role. They also knew that, as a consequence of this procedure, at the moment of making their decisions they would not know their own role or their co-player's decision.
depends on the player's belief about the probability that she is matched with a second mover who cooperates. In our SPD game, a F M = c is a best response for a selfish first mover if and only if the belief about the frequency of second-mover cooperation is at least 3/7 (≈ 43 percent).
What implications may non-selfish preferences have in our game? Suppose first that players are rational but inequality averse (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) . Second movers who dislike advantageous inequality will be reluctant to exploit first-mover cooperation.
Aversion to advantageous inequality thus can explain second-mover cooperation. (In terms of Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) model, a player will choose a SM = c if and only if the parameter measuring her disutility from advantageous inequality is greater than 0.3.) For the first move, aversion to disadvantageous inequality implies that inequality averse players are less inclined to cooperate than selfish players, holding fixed the belief about second-mover cooperation. The reason is that unreciprocated first-mover cooperation causes disadvantageous inequality. In other words, a rational, inequality averse first mover requires a more optimistic belief than a selfish one to still play a F M = c. Thus, when advantageous and disadvantageous inequality aversion are positively correlated, as Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p. 864) argue is plausible, their model predicts a negative correlation of first-and second-mover cooperation (given the standard assumption that beliefs do not systematically vary with preferences). 11 Indeed, Bolton and Ockenfels (2000, p. 182-3) already argue that inequality averse players will more likely be defectors as first movers in the SPD and cooperators as second movers, relative to selfish players.
Can reciprocal preferences (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004) help explain the positive correlation typically found in the data? A sufficiently reciprocal player will cooperate as second mover in the SPD. As a first mover, a reciprocal player is more inclined to cooperate than a selfish player if her belief about the second-mover cooperation probability is greater than 1/2, and less inclined to cooperate if her belief is less than 1/2. Given our parameters, the predicted first-mover behavior of a player with any degree of reciprocity coincides with that for a selfish player for all beliefs, except for the belief that four out of nine second movers in the session are cooperating. In this case, a selfish first mover will cooperate, whereas a sufficiently reciprocal player will defect. Thus, according to the Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger model, if there is any correlation at all, it should be negative (assuming again that beliefs are independent of preferences).
We now turn to total surplus or efficiency considerations, which have been shown to be relevant in distribution experiments (Charness and Rabin 2002, Engelmann and Strobel 2004) . Efficiency gains occur at both stages of the SPD. Hence, a player who cares sufficiently strongly about efficiency would cooperate at both stages, and this would lead to a positive correlation of moves. But, a model based on total surplus considerations would also predict unconditional cooperation by second movers, which usually is rejected in the data (see Footnote 7). The same holds for other types of unconditional altruism.
A number of models, however, are consistent both with conditional second-mover cooperation and a positive correlation of first and second moves. Conditional cooperation can result if efficiency concerns are combined with maximin preferences, as in Charness and Rabin (2002), because in contrast to cooperating after first-mover defection, cooperating after first-mover cooperation increases not only the total but also the minimum payoff. The more elaborate version of Charness and Rabin's (2002) model that includes concern withdrawal -that is, a reduced weight in the utility function on the payoffs of players who "misbehave" -provides even stronger support for conditional cooperation. Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008) can capture the correlation between first-and second-mover choices through heterogeneity in the degree of altruism and conditional second-mover cooperation through reciprocity.
Kranz's (2010) model of rule consequentialism also combines concerns for own payoff and efficiency. Some players (so-called compliers) are assumed to care about complying with a moral norm that maximizes social welfare. Even if the selfish types get full welfare weight, a ruleconsequentialistic norm can prescribe compliant second movers to only conditionally cooperate.
The reason is that selfish first movers get incentives to cooperate if it becomes commonly known that there is a norm of conditional but not unconditional cooperation. Furthermore, compliers are more likely to cooperate as first movers than selfish players. Compliers suffer a disutility when they deviate from the norm of first-mover cooperation, and hence the threshold belief for which cooperation is a best response is lower than the one relevant for a selfish rational player.
Finally, in Levine's (1998) model, own altruism interacts with a player's estimate of the other's altruism. Given the same (sufficiently optimistic) beliefs about the second mover's altruism, an altruistic player is more likely to cooperate as first mover than a selfish one. A more altruistic player is also more likely to cooperate as second mover. But since first-mover defection signals low altruism of the first mover, cooperation after first-mover cooperation is more likely than after first-mover defection.
Could variation in risk preferences explain a correlation between first-and second-mover decisions? As second-mover decisions involve no risk, this would require risk tolerance to be positively related to second-mover cooperation. Burks et al. (2009) indeed find an indirect relation between these two variables: cooperative behavior increases and risk aversion decreases with higher cognitive skills in a subject pool constituted of trainee truckers. But in our setting, for typical degrees of risk aversion, risk preferences can only explain variation in first-mover behavior for subjects with a belief that four out of nine second movers cooperate. A relation between preferences for cooperation and for risk thus would predict no (or only a moderate) positive correlation in first-and second-mover behavior in our experiment.
As discussed in Section 1, the consensus effect offers a plausible alternative explanation for the positive correlation of first-and second-mover choices. A consensus effect is said to occur when players hold a belief that is biased toward their own preference or choice. If players' beliefs about second-mover behavior are subject to a consensus effect and if their first-mover choices are best responses to their beliefs, this means that they are more likely to cooperate as first movers provided they cooperate as second movers. 12
To summarize, the possible explanations for the positive correlation of first-and second-mover decisions typically observed in sequential social dilemma games fall into two camps. The consensus effect which predicts an indirect link between preferences and first-mover decisions, and other explanations that predict a direct link between first-mover decisions and underlying preferences (that is, they should operate even if beliefs are held fixed). The purpose of our experiment is to test whether one or both of these channels are at work in the SPD.
Results

Overview
We begin with a brief overview of the cooperation rates in our experiments. Overall, 49 percent of the first movers and 54 percent of the second movers cooperate. As Table 3 shows, second-mover cooperation rates are virtually identical across treatments, and pairwise comparisons of secondmover cooperation yield no significant differences either (all two-sided Fisher exact tests yield p = 0.999). 13 This indicates that second-mover cooperation in True Distribution is not increased by strategic considerations as discussed in Section 2.1. First-mover cooperation rates are similar, too, with the exception of Baseline. In Baseline, fewer subjects cooperate as first movers than in each of the other treatments, and we reject the hypothesis that all three cooperation rates are the same (two-sided Fisher exact test, p = 0.008). 14 We will return to this treatment effect in Section 4.3; for now, we remark that it is not the overall cooperation rates that matter for our research question, 12 Obviously, a consensus effect does not explain why some second movers cooperate in the first place. Thus even if the correlation between first-and second mover choices is best explained by a consensus effect, a complete explanation of the data will require some preference element that rationalizes second-mover cooperation.
13 Using the uniformly more powerful Boschloo test for 2×2 tables (see Boschloo (1970) and Schlag's (2010) survey) still yields p = 0.999.
14 We find significant pairwise differences in first-mover cooperation for Baseline vs. but the correlation of first-and second-mover decisions and this correlation does materialize in all treatments (see below).
At the treatment level, first-mover cooperation is a risk-neutral best response, because the secondmover cooperation rate exceeds the threshold of 3/7 ≈ 43 percent in all treatments. This does not hold in all individual sessions though, and we examine below the individual subjects' best responses.
Crucially for our research question, we find that most subjects make the same choice as first and as second movers, similar to the results in Blanco et al. (2011) . Table 4 shows that across all treatments, of the 160 subjects, 60 (38%) cooperate in both roles and 55 (34%) defect in both roles. Only 27 subjects (17%) defect as first movers and cooperate as second movers, while the remaining 18 subjects (11%) cooperate as first movers and defect as second movers. We will see below that, depending on the treatment, the correlation of moves has different magnitudes and different meanings and hence is not directly comparable. Nevertheless, we emphasize at this point that overall 72 percent of our subjects make the same decision in the two situations. Instead, given the observed cooperation rates in the different roles, one would only expect between 48 and 51 percent of decisions in the three treatments to coincide by chance if the subjects made their two decisions independently.
The Baseline treatment
Our Baseline treatment is the starting point of the analysis and establishes the aforementioned correlation of first-and second-mover choices. We find a significant phi correlation coefficient of φ = 0.388 (χ 2 = 6.030, d.f. = 1, p = 0.014). In the SPD of Blanco et al. (2011) , the correlation is of a similar magnitude as the one we obtain here (φ = 0.433). To sum up our findings on Baseline:
Result 1 In Baseline, the first and second move are positively correlated.
The Elicit Beliefs treatment
In Elicit Beliefs, subjects have to guess how many of the other nine participants are cooperators, before making their first-mover choice. Eliciting beliefs is not necessarily innocuous as it may affect behavior (for example, Croson 2000). It focuses subjects on thinking about the likelihood of second-mover cooperation by others and could thus change (best-response) first-mover behavior that is decided upon after the belief-elicitation stage. In particular, this could increase the correlation between first and second moves if it is driven by a consensus effect.
Indeed, we find a significant increase in first-mover cooperation rates relative to Baseline (see Section 4.1). Superficially, this looks like contradicting Croson (2000), where cooperation decreases.
But in her experiments it is a dominant strategy not to cooperate, whereas in our setting first-mover cooperation is a best response, given the average second-mover cooperation rates in Baseline and These results show that the relation between beliefs and first-mover behavior is as standard economic logic suggests. this. Specifically, all 13 subjects who believe they are in a session with seven or more second-mover cooperators do cooperate themselves as first movers, and all 17 subjects who believe they are in a sessions with three or fewer second-mover cooperators defect as first movers. For ten (out of 60) subjects, the stated belief is inconsistent with selfish risk-neutral payoff maximization (they all choose a F M = d). A moderate amount of risk aversion can explain the majority of these deviations.
Six of the subjects state a belief of 4/9. For this belief a F M = d is a best response with CRRA-utility in the empirically relevant range for the risk aversion coefficient of 0.3 to 0.5 (Holt and Laury 2002).
As for this belief expected payoffs for a F M = c exceed those for a F M = d by only about 1 percent, small decision errors are an alternative explanation. So, overall, this is strong evidence in favor of best-response behavior.
Elicit Beliefs
True Distribution Marginal effects (at sample means). Standard errors in parenthesis.
* and *** indicate significance at the 10%-and 1%-level respectively. Table 5 shows that the marginal effect of the variable belief is 0.35 and significant (at p < 0.001) in Elicit Beliefs. The top panel of Figure 4 illustrates the result: the smooth black line is derived from specification (E1) and superimposed over the actual frequency of a F M = c choices for a given stated belief about the number of a SM = c players in the session. The sharp increase in first-mover cooperation rates for a belief of four or larger is consistent with selfish expected utility maximization.
Finally, how accurate are stated beliefs? Only seven (12%) of the subjects actually scored a perfect guess (that is, their belief was equal to the correct number of a SM = c players in their session). Indeed, as Figure 3 shows, the belief distribution is spread out over the whole admissible range. But we saw that this is not just noise, as second-mover choice and beliefs are highly correlated.
So the variation in beliefs to a large part arises because they are biased toward subjects' own a SM choices. To sum up our findings on Elicit Beliefs:
Result 2 In Elicit Beliefs, the first and second move are positively correlated. Subjects almost always best respond to their belief, but beliefs are biased toward subjects' own second-mover choices.
The True Distribution treatment
In the previous sections, we saw that first-and second-mover cooperation are strongly correlated.
We also observed that subjects tend to best respond to their beliefs, but that beliefs are biased, which is consistent with a consensus-effect based explanation for this correlation. As illustrated in Figure 1 , True Distribution removes the impact of the consensus effect on beliefs. A subject knows the true number of a SM = c players she faces before making her first-mover choice. Accordingly, this treatment reveals whether first-mover decisions can be explained as best responses to beliefs, or whether the direct channel described in Figure 1 also operates.
Are subjects best responding to the feedback in True Distribution? The majority of first movers do: 38 (63.3%) pick the risk neutral best response. Of the remaining 22 subjects, 10 got a feedback of four and do not cooperate, which again can be explained by risk aversion.
Note that looking only at the correlation of moves can lead to wrong conclusions in True Distribution. In particular, if there was a correlation of decisions at the treatment level here, this would not necessarily indicate that it is driven by the direct channel. To see this, imagine two experimental sessions. Suppose that every subject defects as second mover in the first session and every subject cooperates in the second session. Now, if all subjects best responded to the feedback they received before making their first-mover choice, the data from both sessions would indicate all subjects making the same choice as first and as second movers, even though first-mover choices were To test whether the direct channel operates, we analyze the correlation of first and second moves while controlling for the feedback regarding the second moves. This is what the probit regressions in Table 5 do. Specification (T1) is an intermediate step which regresses first-mover choices only on the feedback about the exact number of second-mover cooperators that subject i faces in her session (# a SM −i = c). In specification (T2), we then add as explanatory variable a dummy for the subject's own second-mover decision (cooperation:
The correlation of first and second move prevails even with the feedback given in True Distribution: the marginal effect of a SM i in specification (T2) is 0.26 and it is significant (p = 0.056). Moreover, adding the subject's own second-mover choice also improves the pseudo R 2 compared to specification (T1) (in the corresponding OLS regression the adjusted R 2 increases from 0.23 to 0.27). So, overall, even when we give accurate feedback about second-mover cooperation rates, there still remains a bias toward a player's own type (cooperator or defector). 17 Most explanatory power, however, comes from the feedback variable: if one starts with a SM i only and adds # a SM −i = c, the adjusted R 2 in the OLS regression increases from 0.07 to 0.27. Figure 5 illustrates the difference in predicted cooperation rates of a SM = c and a SM = d players, respectively, based on specification (T2). The differences are quantitatively substantial: in the range of feedback of two to eight that we observe in the data, a second-mover cooperator is between three and seven percentage points more likely to cooperate as first mover than a second-mover defector.
Result 3 In True Distribution, although most subjects best respond to the feedback, the first and second move are still positively correlated (when we control for the feedback).
16 Similarly, the nearly identical share of subjects choosing the same action in both moves in Baseline and True Distribution does not imply that the indirect channel does not operate in Baseline, because heterogeneity in feedback across sessions drives part of the correlation in True Distribution.
17 This bias is also seen when we consider the 22 subjects who do not play the risk-neutral best response to the feedback. Among these, 16 choose the same action as first and second mover. In particular, among the seven subjects who choose a F M = C even though a F M = D is the best response, five have chosen a SM = C, which could be an indication that these subjects have a strong preference to cooperate in either role. 
Discussion
Comparing the Elicit Beliefs and the True Distribution data, we note two findings that are relevant for our research question. First, in True Distribution, a positive correlation between first-and second-mover decisions remains even after conditioning on feedback. This suggests that the correlations found in previous experiments (where such feedback was not given) are not driven exclusively by a consensus effect. This is also consistent with the positive marginal effect of the subject's own second-mover choice in the probit specification (E2) for Elicit Beliefs in Table 5 The latter finding is consistent with the marginal effects of the Probit regressions reported in Table 5 . Note that the marginal effect of the reported belief in the Elicit Beliefs treatment is more than twice as large as that of the feedback given in the True Distribution treatment, suggesting that subjects respond more strongly to their own belief in Elicit Belief than to the feedback given in True Distribution. This pattern is illustrated in Figure 6 , which plots the marginal effects from probit specifications (E2) and (T2) in Table 5 . As one can see, over most of the range the marginal effect of belief in Elicit Beliefs is much bigger than that of feedback about the number of second-mover cooperators in True Distribution (recall, that we actually only observe feedback values between two and eight). Similarly, the comparison of the top and bottom panels in Figure 4 illustrates this stronger reaction to beliefs in Elicit Belief. While the above regression-based results need to be taken with a grain of salt because of potential collinearity (see Footnote 18), the bottom panel in Figure 4 does reveal that in True Distribution a share of subjects cooperate as first movers even when defection is the risk-neutral best response (that is, when feedback is less than four). This never happens in Elicit Belief, as the top panel shows.
We can make sense of the above findings as follows. We know that the belief is highly correlated with the subject's own second-mover choice in Elicit Beliefs. Because of this correlation, and the fact that our direct measure of second-mover preferences is a binary choice, the belief of a subject can partly capture the intensity of her preferences. So people with strong preferences will have strong beliefs and a clear best response as first mover, which in turn agrees with their preference for cooperation or defection. As a result, in Elicit Beliefs, a strong effect of preferences on the first-mover decision via the direct channel in Figure 1 cannot be distinguished from a strong effect through the indirect channel.
As True Distribution removes the link between beliefs and preferences, the significant a SM coefficient suggests that the direct channel is also, to some extent, responsible for first-mover decisions.
This cannot be detected in Elicit Beliefs, in contrast, because the direct channel can dominate the indirect one only for subjects with strong preferences for or against cooperation, but for these subjects the prediction via the direct channel will agree with that of the indirect channel.
This suggests an important caveat when interpreting data from social dilemma experiments. Even if regression results seem to attribute the correlation of first-and second-mover choices completely to a consensus effect, this may in fact not be the right conclusion. The direct link between choices and preferences may just be hidden because the constrained set of choices does not fully reflect the intensity of preferences. Moreover, separate identification of a direct and indirect channel is problematic because of potential collinearity between second-mover decision and beliefs arising from the consensus effect. Our True Distribution treatment circumvents this problem and allows for separate identification.
From treatment True Distribution we further infer that combining the inequality aversion models of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) or Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , or the reciprocity model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) with a consensus effect cannot provide a rationalization for all our results.
Such combined models could rationalize the results in Baseline and Elicit Beliefs, as the preference element can capture the second-mover cooperation and the consensus effect the correlation between first-and second-mover cooperation. But all these models predict a negative correlation, or no correlation between first-and second-mover cooperation when beliefs are exogenously imposed as in True Distribution -contrary to the positive correlation we find.
As our final point, if subjects are prone to a consensus effect, this should also show up in the beliefs about first-mover choices that we elicit at the end of True Distribution and Baseline. Indeed, we find significant correlations of own first-mover choice and the belief about the other subjects' first-mover choices in Baseline (rank biserial correlation r rb = 0.414, t = 2.802, p < 0.001) and
True Distribution (rank biserial correlation r rb = 0.531, t = 4.767, p < 0.001).
Conclusion
In spite of its importance for decision making in games, the interaction of preferences and beliefs is rather unexplored in the economics literature. In this paper, we present an experiment specifically designed to shed light on this interdependence. Recent findings in sequential social dilemma experiments with within-subject designs, show that subjects who defect as first movers are more likely to exploit first-mover cooperation in their second-mover choice than those who cooperate as first movers. Possible explanations for the positive correlation of first-and second-mover decisions fall into two camps. One predicts an indirect link between preferences and first-mover decisions based on a consensus effect, according to which people think others behave similarly as they do and best respond to these beliefs. The other predicts a direct link between decisions based on some underlying (social) preference -a channel that should operate even if beliefs are held fixed.
To explore whether the direct or indirect channel, or both, are driving the correlation between first-and second-mover decisions, we run three treatments of a sequential-move prisoner's dilemma experiment. In our baseline treatment, subjects choose in both roles. In a second treatment, we additionally elicit first-order beliefs relevant for the first-mover decision. In line with previous experiments, we observe a strong correlation of the two moves, no matter whether we elicit beliefs or not. Elicited beliefs, too, are strongly correlated with both moves. This supports the view that the relationship between first-and second-mover decisions operates through the indirect channel via a consensus effect. While this result is in line with a number of recent studies in similar games, it is in conflict with traditional views that (at least implicitly) consider beliefs and preferences as independent.
In order to investigate whether the correlation between first-and second-mover decisions is completely driven by this indirect channel, we isolate the possible direct channel by eliminating the indirect channel. This is done in our third treatment, where we give as feedback the actual frequency of second-mover cooperators, before subjects decide their first move. The correlation of the first-and second-mover decisions prevails in this treatment. This suggests that the correlation found in the other treatments and previous experiments is not exclusively driven by a consensus effect, but that there also is an underlying non-belief based motive affecting both second-and first-mover choices.
We discuss a number of social preference theories that would provide a preference-based explanation for the correlation of first-and second-mover cooperation, such as rule consequentialism (Kranz 2010), a mixture of total surplus and maximin preferences with concern withdrawal for defecting first movers (Charness and Rabin 2002), or reciprocal altruism (Levine 1998, Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj 2008) .
A lesson from our experiment is that the consensus effect seems to play a major role for the observed behavior in social dilemmas. It should therefore receive more attention in behavioral economic theory. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that the direct channel also has a role to play, and that it is actually worth to incorporate this channel into models and to further investigate the precise forces at work empirically.
Indeed, the relationship between first-and second-mover behavior as well as beliefs is complex, trust game the minimal return probability that first movers require in order to trust. They find that this is higher than in a game where the decision to return is not made by a second mover, but by a random device. The results suggest that the trust decision is not just driven by beliefs and risk aversion, but also by betrayal aversion. Similarly, Kosfeld et al. (2005) find that administration of the hormone oxytocin significantly increases first-mover trust rates, but that it neither influences risk taking nor beliefs. Interestingly, oxytocin has no impact on trustworthiness either. So their study suggests that a missing element for explaining the first move in the trust game could be an additional preference element driving trust but not trustworthiness. In other words, while trust and trustworthiness are strongly correlated in our and other studies, trust cannot be perfectly predicted by trustworthiness and beliefs alone.
Further evidence suggesting that those elements of preferences which affect first-mover behavior in social dilemmas do not perfectly overlap with those that affect second-mover behavior comes from Naef et al. (2008) and Fehr (2009) . Based on the same data source, their results document that risk aversion and betrayal aversion (which are survey-measured here) affect first-mover behavior in a trust game, but not beliefs regarding trustworthiness. This shows, once more, that first-mover trust is not only driven by beliefs. Furthermore, the absence of an effect on beliefs suggests that these measures pick up elements of preferences that only affect first-, but not second-mover behavior, and for this reason do not influence beliefs via a consensus effect.
Taking our study and those discussed above together, the following picture emerges. The firstmover decision is to a large extent driven by beliefs (that are themselves affected by preferences through a consensus effect), but beliefs do not completely explain the first-mover choice. Social preferences and risk preferences also matter. Furthermore, some preference aspects appear to yield a general tendency to cooperate in either role, while others only affect behavior in one of the roles.
Recent studies, including ours, have contributed to a much clearer, though far from conclusive understanding of the complex interactions among these elements. 
A Experimental Instructions [not for publication]
A.1 Instructions for Elicit Beliefs
As described in Section 2.1, we conducted two variants of Elicit Beliefs to test for hedging confounds.
In Variant 1 (three sessions) we pay for both the decisions and the beliefs, whereas in Variant 2 (the remaining three sessions), we pay for either the belief or the decision (both with equal probability).
You are now taking part in an experiment. If you read the following instructions carefully, you can, depending on your and other participants' decisions, earn a considerable amount of money.
It is therefore important that you take your time to understand the instructions. Please do not communicate with the other participants during the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and ask us. All the information you provide will be treated anonymously.
At the end of the experiment your earnings will be converted from Experimental Currency Units Overview of the experiment: The experiment consists of three parts. You and the other participants will each make decisions both in the role of Person A and of Person B. Additionally, we will ask you to make a guess how the other participants in the room decided. At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly assign you either the role of Person A or the role of Person B, and will also randomly match you and the other participants in pairs. Note that you will have to make your decisions without knowing the role that you will ultimately be assigned. Also, at the time when you make your decisions, you will not know the decision made by the participant matched to you. Below, we will explain how your payment from the experiment is determined. But let us first have a closer look at your tasks in the order that they will appear. Tasks and for the Guess Task. Your overall payoff will be converted at a rate of ECU 2 = £ 1.
Payoffs for the individual tasks are determined as follows.
Payoff for the Decision Tasks: As mentioned,...]
[Variant 2 : At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly decide whether your payment will be based on the Decision Tasks or the Guess Task. Each type of tasks is equally likely to be the one determining your payoff, and will be the same for all subjects. (This means whenever you are paid based on the Decision Tasks, also all other participants are paid based on the Decision Tasks; and whenever you are paid for the Guess Task, this is also the case for all other participants.)
Your overall payoff will be converted at a rate of ECU 1 = £ 1. Depending on the random draw of the computer, payoffs are determined as follows.
Payoff if the random draw of the computer selects the Decision Tasks: As mentioned,] the computer will randomly and anonymously pair you with another participant in the room. One of you will randomly be assigned the role of Person A, and the other one will be assigned the role of Person B. The computer will then take your and the other participant's relevant Decision Task choices to compute your payoffs as shown in Figure 1 .
[ • You can see that a perfect guess earns you ECU 15. For example, if your guess was 6, and if there are actually 6 people who chose LEFT in Decision Task B, you get ECU 15.
• If your guess is completely off the mark you earn nothing. This occurs if you guess that 9 other participants chose LEFT, while none of them did so; or if you guess that none of the other participants chose LEFT, while all of them did so.
• Otherwise, your payoff depends on how close to accurate your guess was. For example, if 6 out of the other 9 participants chose LEFT, and your guess was that 3 participants would do so, you earn ECU 13.30.
Before starting with the actual experiment, we will ask you to answer a few control questions. Then we will go through the three parts of the experiment. There will be plenty of time before each decision to ask questions. At the end of the experiment we ask you to answer a few questions.
These answers will not affect your final payment.
Are there any questions? If so, please raise your hand.
A.2 Instructions for Baseline
The instructions are the same as in Elicit Beliefs (Variant 2), except that the Guess Task (included only to achieve balanced designs) now comes last, and asks about the first-mover decisions of the other participants: The decision task is followed by a feedback stage. There are 10 participants in the room, you and 9 other participants. All of them also did the above Decision Task B. The feedback stage informs you about how many of the 9 other participants chose LEFT in Decision Task B.
2. Decision Task A: ...
B Oral Summaries [not for publication] B.1 Oral Summary for Elicit Beliefs
Welcome to the experiment. Please do not communicate with the other participants during the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and ask us. At your seat you will find a set of instructions. Read them carefully now. Please answer the questions you find on a separate page and raise your hand if you are finished. Before the experiment starts we will give a brief summary.
After instructions were read, before Decision Task B: To summarize: Please look at Figure 1 in the instructions. The experiment starts with Decision Task B. Next will be the Guess Task, and finally we come to Decision Task A. You will have to do each task only once. We will briefly summarize the tasks when we get to them.
[Variant 2 : At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly decide for all participants whether the Decision Tasks are going to be the basis for payments, or the Guess task.]
At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly matches you with one of the other participants in the room. One of you will be assigned the role of Person A and the other that of Person B -both roles are equally likely. [Variant 1: The payoffs for the Decision Tasks will then be computed based on your and the other participant's choices in the relevant Decision Tasks. In addition, the Guess task will be paid. The whole amount will then be converted to Pounds Sterling at a rate of 2 ECU = £ 1/ Variant 2: If the Decision tasks will be the basis for payments, the payoffs will then be computed based on your and the other participant's choices in the relevant Decision tasks. Otherwise, the Guess task will be paid. The payoff amount will then be converted to Pounds Sterling at a rate of 1 ECU = £ 1.]
We start with Decision Task Are there any questions?
B.2 Oral Summary for Baseline
The summary is the same as in Elicit Beliefs (Variant 2), except that the Guess Task now comes last, and asks about the first-mover decisions of the other participants.
B.3 Oral Summary for True Distribution
The summary is the same as in Baseline, except that there is an additional Feedback Stage after Are there any questions?
Between Feedback Stage and Decision Task A: ...
